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Federally recognized Indian tribes are governments within our
1
federal legal system. Tribes have aboriginal sovereignty that provides
2
them with inherent governmental powers, such as the power to tax.
Tribal sovereignty also protects tribes from state interference, such as
3
state taxation of tribal lands. Both the exercise of tribal governmental powers and the tribal immunity from state interference have a
territorial component. This makes the status of Indian lands a critical
4
inquiry into tribal/state relations. Because of the importance of land
† Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota);
Commissioner, Navajo Tax Commission, Navajo Nation (Arizona, New Mexico,
Utah); Commissioner, Tesuque Tax Commission, Tesuque Pueblo (New Mexico);
Associate Justice, Court of Appeals, Prairie Island Indian Community (Minnesota).
1. See John E. Thorson, Proceedings of the Symposium on the Settlement of Indian
Water Rights Claims, 22 ENVTL. L. 1009, 1023 (1992).
2. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (finding that the tribal power to tax is a “fundamental
attribute of sovereignty,” and that tribes have always had a “broad measure of civil
jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands”).
3. See In re The New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866) (involving New York’s
attempt to tax tribal lands still occupied by tribal members).
4. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009) (involving Rhode Island’s
assertion that lands placed in trust for the benefit of the Narragansett Indian Tribe
were not trust lands because the Secretary of Interior lacked the authority to place the
lands in trust; as a result, the housing project undertaken by the Tribe on these lands
was subject to local land use regulations).
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status in federal Indian law, especially in matters involving taxation,
5
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Carcieri v. Salazar deserves
special attention. In the Carcieri case, the Court held that the
Secretary of the Interior did not have the statutory authority to place
lands into trust on behalf of Indian tribes that were recognized after
6
the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
Part I of this article discusses the Carcieri case. I criticize the
Court’s decision in part II, and explain how the Court reached its
conclusion through sloppy statutory interpretation that ignored
significant sections of text within the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934. Part III explores the breadth of the Carcieri decision and
demonstrates that its holding is far reaching. With part IV, I consider
the tribal, state, and federal tax consequences that occur when lands
thought previously to be Indian trust lands take on a new status as
non-trust lands that might be owned by the United States, by the
individual tribe, or by a third party.
I.

SUMMARY OF CARCIERI V. SALAZAR

Before the British colonization of New England, the Narragansett
7
Indian Tribe occupied the greater part of what is now Rhode Island.
England and the Colony of Rhode Island dealt with the Narragansett
8
Indian Tribe as an independent nation beginning in 1622. The
devastation of King Phillip’s War in 1675 nearly destroyed the Tribe,
9
which joined forces with the Niantic Tribe. The Colony of Rhode
Island asserted guardianship over the Narragansett Indian Tribe in
10
1709 and, almost two centuries later, terminated its relationship with
11
the Tribe in 1880 when it enacted “detribalization” legislation. In
12
1934, Rhode Island again recognized the Tribe. In the 1970s, the
Tribe filed a land claim based on Rhode Island’s violation of the

5. Id.
6. Id. at 1060–61.
7. See id. at 1061. See also Narragansett Indian Tribe, Historical Perspective of
the Narragansett Indian Tribe: Early History, http://www.narragansett-tribe.org/
history.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
8. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177–78 (Feb. 10, 1983).
9. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1061 n.1.
10. Id. at 1061.
11. See id.
12. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. at 6177–78.
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federal law that restricted state purchases of Indian lands. This
14
lawsuit led to federal legislation settling the Tribe’s land claims case.
In 1983, the Tribe received federal recognition and became a
15
federally recognized Indian tribe.
In 1991, the Tribe’s housing authority purchased thirty-one acres
of land adjacent to the Tribe’s 1800 acre reservation created by the
16
settlement legislation. The Tribe planned on constructing housing
17
for tribal elders. The local township, however, sought an injunction
to stop the construction of the project because it did not comply with
the township’s land use regulations restricting development to one
18
residential unit for every two acres of land. The tribal housing
19
project contemplated fifty units on the thirty-one acres. The Tribe
asserted that its newly acquired land was a dependent Indian community within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and, therefore, was
exempt from the local regulations that would have imposed density
20
restrictions. The federal First Circuit Court of Appeals held that this
thirty-one-acre parcel of land was not a dependent Indian community
21
because the federal government did not own the land.
At the beginning of the project, the Tribe had asked the Secretary of the Interior to accept the thirty-one-acre parcel in trust under
22
25 U.S.C. § 465. This provision, enacted by section 5 of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, allowed the Secretary of the Interior to
acquire lands on behalf of tribes as part of the process of partially
23
restoring their land base. After the conclusion of the litigation on
the question of whether the thirty-one-acre tract was a dependent
Indian community, the Secretary of Interior accepted the Tribe’s
24
request. The township and the Governor of Rhode Island contested
25
this federal action. Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Rhode Island
13. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1061–62.
14. See id. at 1062.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Narragansett Indian Tribe, Housing Department, http://www
.narragansett-tribe.org/housing-dept.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
18. Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2007), abrogated by Carcieri
v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
19. Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 24 n.4.
20. See id.
21. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 921–22 (1st
Cir. 1996).
22. Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1062 (2009).
23. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1066.
24. See id. at 1062.
25. Id. at 1060–61.
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argued that the Secretary of Interior did not have the statutory
authority to take the land in trust because the authority to do so
applied only to those tribes that were federally recognized before
26
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, ruled that the legislation authorizing the Secretary of
Interior to place lands in trust for tribes was limited to those tribes in
27
existence on or before June 18, 1934.
As a result, the Court
concluded that the thirty-one-acre parcel was not “Indian Country”
28
and was, therefore, subject to state regulation. The Court’s opinion
is remarkably sloppy in its misreading of the federal statute. The
Court glosses over the meaning and the importance of the word
“includes,” misreads the applicable text of the Indian Reorganization
Act, and thereby restricts the authority of the Secretary of Interior to
take land into trust.
II. CRITICISM OF THE DECISION IN THE CARCIERI CASE
My criticism of the Carcieri decision requires initial consideration
of the legal context in which tribes find themselves. Federally
recognized Indian tribes are governments within the federal legal
29
system.
Their current sovereignty is actually their aboriginal
sovereignty reduced by treaty, by federal legislation, or by necessary
30
implication of their dependent status. Congress, given its power
over Indian affairs, has the authority to affirm, confirm, or restore the
31
sovereignty of Indian tribes. Most of the sovereignty that tribes have
lost over the last thirty years, however, has resulted from decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court.
32
Beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme
26. Id. at 1061.
27. Id. June 18, 1934, was the date of enactment of the Indian Reorganization
Act. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 985 (1934) (current version
at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006)).
28. Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1061.
29. See Thorson, supra note 1, at 1023.
30. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 152–53 (1980) (discussing tribal sovereignty in relation to taxation,
concluding that tribes have sovereignty “unless divested of it by federal law or
necessary implication of their dependent status”).
31. See Lara v. United States, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (confirming the “plenary
and exclusive” power of Congress over Indian affairs).
32. 435 U.S. 191, 206–08 (1978) (holding that a tribe had no criminal
jurisdiction over a non-Indian who assaulted a tribal police officer on reservation
lands).
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Court handed down a series of decisions that have diminished tribal
sovereignty without any apparent concern for its protection or its
33
preservation as intended in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
The case of Montana v. United States established that fee lands within
reservations further limited tribal sovereignty, allowing a tribe to
assert civil jurisdiction only if the tribe had a consensual relationship
with a non-Indian or if tribal civil authority was necessary to preserve
34
the tribe’s political integrity. In Duro v. Reina, the Court extended its
holding in Oliphant and further restricted tribal criminal jurisdiction
35
over non-member Indians. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court
treated a highway right-of-way the same as fee lands so that the
restrictions in the Montana case applied and deprived a tribal court of
civil jurisdiction over a lawsuit involving an automobile accident that
36
took place within the tribe’s reservation. In Nevada v. Hicks, the
Court restricted a tribal court’s civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian
who entered the reservation and allegedly committed a tort against a
37
tribal member. In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Court applied
the Montana case to prohibit the Navajo Nation from imposing its
hotel occupancy tax on a hotel that was located on fee land within the
reservation when the hotel’s owner did not have an agreement with
38
the Tribe consenting to the tribal tax.
The holdings in these cases, if extended to states, would yield
ridiculous legal results. Under the rationales of Oliphant and Duro,
states would be unable to assert criminal jurisdiction over nonresidents. State courts, applying the holdings of the Montana and A-1
Contractors cases, would have no civil jurisdiction over transactions not
occurring on lands owned by the state or even on federal highways
constructed on state lands. If the holding in Atkinson Trading Co.
applied to states, they would be unable to impose their taxes on
people living on private lands. Imagine writing your state department
of revenue and explaining that you want your state income taxes
refunded to you because you live and work on private lands not

33. For background on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, see Scott A.
Taylor, The Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: State Income Taxation of NonMember Indians, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 917, 948 (2008), which describes how Congress
intended to undertake efforts to promote tribal sovereignty and to help tribes regain
some of their lost lands.
34. See 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
35. See 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
36. See 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
37. See 533 U.S. 353, 359–69 (2001).
38. See 532 U.S. 645, 654–57 (2001).
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owned by the state. Next time you stay in a hotel, ask the hotel clerk
to remove the local hotel occupancy tax from your bill because the
hotel is located on private lands that the state does not own. Under
the reasoning of the Hicks case, states would have no civil jurisdiction
over tort actions brought by state residents against non-residents, even
if the tort was committed within the state on state lands.
This backdrop of Supreme Court disregard for tribal sovereignty
is reflected in the rather shoddy statutory analysis of the Court in its
Carcieri decision. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 undertook
to undo only a small part of over three centuries of dispossession of
Native Americans, especially the destructive effects of forty years of
39
allotment and assimilation. Congress concluded that the General
Allotment Act had been a failure and that tribal sovereignty needed to
40
be confirmed and restored. Part of the restoration process involved
reacquisition of the tribal land base that had been lost through
41
allotment and other forces. To accomplish this restoration policy,
Congress gave the Secretary of the Interior the authority to acquire
42
lands and to hold them in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes. In
its Carcieri opinion, the Court construed the statute’s definition of
43
“Indian” as excluding any members of tribes not recognized by the
federal government on or before the date of enactment of the Indian
44
Reorganization Act.
The land in trust provision is in section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act and states:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion,
to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or
surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments,
whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose
of providing land for Indians . . . .
Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this
39. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 948–49.
40. Id. at 948.
41. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006) (codifying section 5 of the Indian Reorganization
Act, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to reacquire Indian lands).
42. See id.
43. Actually, the Court and 15 U.S.C. § 479 use the phrase “now under Federal
jurisdiction.” I use the phrase “federally recognized Indian tribe” because the
Department of Interior is now required to maintain a list of “federally recognized
Indian tribes.” See Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C.
§ 479a–a-1 (2006).
44. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1064 (2009).
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Act . . . shall be taken in the name of the United States in
trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the
land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt
45
from State and local taxation.
The text of the definition section, on which the Court based its
decision in Carcieri, is contained in section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act and states:
The term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized
Indian tribe now under Federal Jurisdiction . . . . The term
“tribe” wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer
to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians
46
residing on one reservation.
The key to the Court’s misreading of the statute is its overemphasis on the word “now.” The Court first should have focused on the
word “include” instead of “now.” The word “include” is used pervasively in federal legislation to provide partial definitions of things that
are specifically included, but without explicit limitation. The very
beginning of the United States Code is a good example. In 1 U.S.C. §
1, Congress uses the word “include” time after time to bring things
within a general definition without limiting the defined term to those
things following “include” or “shall include:”
§ 1. Words denoting number, gender, and so forth
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless
the context indicates otherwise —
words importing the singular include and apply to several
persons, parties, or things;
words importing the plural include the singular;
words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well;
words used in the present tense include the future as well as
the present;
the words “insane” and “insane person” and “lunatic” shall
include every idiot, lunatic, insane person, and person non
compos mentis;
the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies, as well as individuals;
“officer” includes any person authorized by law to perform
45.
46.

25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006).
25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006) (all emphases added).
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the duties of the office;
“signature” or “subscription” includes a mark when the
person making the same intended it as such;
“oath” includes affirmation, and “sworn” includes affirmed;
“writing” includes printing and typewriting and reproductions of visual symbols by photographing, multigraphing,
47
mimeographing, manifolding, or otherwise.
The above definitions all operate in a way that adds items to the
general definition. If Congress intends to limit a term to a precise
48
and limited category of things or items, it uses the word “means.”
Elsewhere in Title 25 of the United States Code, which contains
the codification of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, we find
additional examples of Congress using “includes” or “shall include” in
an illustrative, as opposed to a delimiting, sense. In 25 U.S.C. § 443a,
for example, a provision allowing transfers by the federal government
of property to tribes defines “Indian” this way: “the term ‘Indian’ shall
49
include Eskimos and Aleuts.” Obviously, the statute allowing transfers
of property to tribes also extends to tribes whose members are
Indians, other than Eskimos or Aleuts. This example illustrates how a
careless reading of this illustrative definition using “shall include”
would lead to the erroneous conclusion that Congress intended to
exclude tribes in the lower forty-eight states. It is apparent that
Congress intended to include tribes from Alaska, along with those
from the lower forty-eight states, and used an inclusive definition to
50
accomplish its goal.
One of the Court’s mistakes in Carcieri was to read “shall include”
51
as “shall mean.” In so doing, the Court unjustifiably limited the
scope of the land-to-trust provision contained in the Indian Reorgani47. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (all emphases added).
48. See Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572, 1578 n.3 (2008) (explaining that
“includes” is a word of enlargement and not limitation whereas “means” imports an
exclusive definition); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979) (stating that
a definition that uses the word “means” excludes any other meaning that is not
stated); Groman v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 82, 86 (1937) (defining “means” as exclusive
and “includes” as enlarging a term having a common meaning). See also 26 U.S.C. §
7701(c) (2006) (“The terms ‘includes’ and ‘including’ when used in a definition
contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within
the meaning of the term defined.”).
49. 25 U.S.C. § 443a (2006) (emphasis added).
50. See Inter-Tribal Council of Nev. v. Hodel, 856 F.2d 1344, 1351 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989) (ruling on a question of standing, the court
acknowledged that a Nevada tribe could be eligible for a grant under 25 U.S.C. §
433a).
51. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (2009).
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zation Act. The Court justified its reading of “shall include” to mean
“shall mean” because the list of three categories of Indians was
52
The Court’s logic, however, is flawed because
comprehensive.
members of tribes to be recognized in the future would be “Indians”
under the generally accepted definition. Accordingly, the definition
easily could be read as insuring inclusion of members of tribes
recognized before enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act
without excluding members of tribes that may be recognized in the
future. This is entirely consistent with the statutory use of an
inclusive, not delimiting, definition of the term “Indian.”
Instead of first focusing on “include,” the Court concentrated on
53
the meaning of the word “now.” The Court basically ignored the
legislative history dealing with the insertion of the word “now” in
section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act. The legislative history
clearly shows that the word “now” was added to section 19 as something of a political compromise over issues totally unrelated to the
54
land-to-trust provisions.
The Court did not pay even minimal
attention to this legislative history. Had it done so, the Court would
have had to find that the word “now” lacked the definitional clarity
55
that the Court supposed. This lack of clarity makes the term “now”
ambiguous in the context of section 19. Had the Court recognized
this obvious ambiguity, it would have been required to give deference
to the interpretation of the Department of Interior, which had
consistently construed section 19 as not limiting the Secretary’s
56
authority under section 5.
Finally, as an explicit rule of statutory construction, Congress
provides that “words used in the present tense include the future as
57
well as the present.” The Court might respond by asserting that only
verbs have a tense. However, the text of the statute says “words” not
“verbs.” And as the Court explained, “now” as an adjective or as an
58
adverb imports a meaning “[a]t the present time.” Accordingly,
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 26–30 (1st Cir. 2007) (reviewing the
confusing circumstances that led to the addition of the word “now”), rev’d sub nom.
Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
55. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1076 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
56. See id. at 1073–74.
57. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (noting also that the definitions used for statutory
construction do not apply if the context indicates that use of the definitional rules
would be inappropriate) (emphasis added).
58. See Carcieri, 128 S. Ct. at 1064 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1671 (2d ed. 1934) (alteration in original)).
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“now” indicates the present tense and 1 U.S.C. § 1 defines the present
tense as including the future as well as the present. Applying this
Congress-made rule of statutory construction, the conclusion is
obvious —“now” includes the future unless the context indicates
otherwise. The Court did not persuasively show that the context of
section 19 required a narrow reading of the word “now.” In fact,
section 7 of the Indian Reorganization Act authorized the Secretary of
59
the Interior to establish new reservations. These new reservations
undoubtedly would include tribes that had not been recognized
before enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act. Section 7
provides a context from which we can safely and easily infer that
“now” as used in section 19 includes members of tribes to be recognized in the future.
The Court’s final, biggest, and most obvious mistake in its interpretation of section § 19, was to ignore the definition of the word
60
“tribe” contained in the same text that defines “Indian.” In section
19, Congress defines “tribe” as “any Indian tribe, organized band,
61
pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.” The temporal
62
limitation of “now” is not in the text of the definition of “tribe.” The
absence of “now” in the definition of “tribe” makes perfect sense
because section 7 of the Indian Reorganization Act authorizes the
63
Secretary of the Interior to establish new reservations. These new
reservations presumably would involve recognition of tribes after the
64
date of enactment of the statute in 1934. Accordingly, the definition
of “tribe” obviously referred to those tribes already recognized as of
the date of enactment of the statute together with newly recognized
tribes that would have new reservations after the date of enactment.
The Court’s use of the definition of the word “tribe” instead of
“Indian” would have been a rational approach because the land-intrust action undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior was for the
benefit of the Narragansett Indian Tribe and not for individual
owners. The beneficiary of the trust relationship was the tribe.
Accordingly, the Court should have looked to the definition of the
word “tribe,” the definition of which was not limited by the word
65
“now.” One could argue that this is an instance of the Court being
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

25 U.S.C. § 467 (2006).
See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006).
Id.
See id.
See id. § 467.
See id. § 461.
See id. § 479.
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so ad hoc that it lost its ability to undertake fairly straight-forward legal
reasoning.
Looking now at the specific facts in the Carcieri case, we see that
the Department of Interior placed the specific land in trust for the
66
Narragansett Indian Tribe, not for individual members of the Tribe.
The land-in-trust provision specifically allows lands to be placed in
67
trust for tribes or for individuals. To achieve its desired result, the
Court basically applied the wrong rule. Had the Court applied the
correct rule for tribes, the result would have been abundantly clear.
Under the language of the statute, the Department of Interior clearly
had and still has the authority to place land into trust for any Indian
tribe without regard to the date of the tribe’s federal recognition.
III. BREADTH OF APPLICATION
The possible breadth of the application of the Supreme Court
ruling in Carcieri v. Salazar is uncertain and unsettling. Under the
holding of the case, all land-into-trust transfers for the benefit of
tribes not recognized on or before the date of enactment of the
68
Indian Reorganization Act are deemed to be invalid. The invalidity
of these transfers means that these “Carcieri” lands are not subject to
tribal authority but instead are subject to state authority. For
purposes of this article, the potential tax implications are striking.
As of the date of this article, there are 564 federally recognized
69
Indian tribes. On the date of the enactment of the Indian Reorgani70
zation Act, the United States recognized 292 tribes. During the
1950s and 60s, the United States terminated federal recognition of
71
many tribes. Thirty-seven of these tribes have reestablished them72
selves through federal recognition. With the admission of Alaska to
the Union in 1959, more than 200 tribes were added to the list of

66. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063 (2009).
67. See 25 U.S.C. § 465.
68. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1068.
69. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REF. NO. 2007-10007, A STATISTICAL PORTRAYAL OF FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS’
TAX FILING CHARACTERISTICS FOR TAX YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2004 1 (2007) (noting 564
federally recognized Indian Tribes), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/
auditreports/2007reports/200710007fr.pdf.
70. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-49, INDIAN ISSUES: IMPROVEMENT
NEEDED IN TRIBAL RECOGNITION PROCESS 21 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0249.pdf (discussing federal recognition of Indian tribes).
71. See id. at 23.
72. See id.
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73

federally recognized Indian tribes.
Since 1934, Congress has
recognized sixteen tribes and the Department of Interior has
74
recognized thirty-one. For all tribes not recognized on the date of
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934 or that were
terminated and then reestablished, special care must be taken to
identify those lands that the Secretary of Interior may have placed in
trust under the authority of section 5 of the Indian Reorganization
75
Act. After Carcieri any and all of these lands previously viewed as
under tribal authority are arguably under the authority of the state in
which they are located.
The tax implications are mind-boggling. Section 5, for example,
76
provides an explicit exemption from state and local taxation. If
section 5, because of the decision in Carcieri, does not apply, then
77
these lands may be subject to state property taxation. Because the
initial transfer in trust was invalid, the lands may have been subjected
to state and local property taxation from the time of initial tribal
ownership. Property tax liabilities may be limited by the applicable
statute of limitations, but under the best of circumstances, this limits
78
liability for the last three to six years. Property taxes are not the only
79
taxes that come into question.
IV. TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY AFTER CARCIERI
80

“[T]he power to tax [is] the power to destroy.” For many gov81
ernments, tax revenue is the lifeblood of the state. Without the
power to tax, many political entities could not exist. In our federal
system, the three sovereigns—tribes, states, and the federal govern82
ment —compete for the same tax base. The power to tax, as a
73. See id. at 23–24.
74. See id. at 24.
75. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006).
76. See id.
77. See infra notes 134–57 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-5-23 (2009) (providing the assessor of property
taxes with the power to assess back taxes for up to six years if the lands have previously
escaped assessment of the local property tax).
79. See infra notes 158–68 and accompanying text.
80. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
81. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVS/09-2, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2009pubs/qtaxbr-q092.pdf (showing the major sources of and growth in tax
revenues for state and local governments within the United States).
82. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99–100
(2005) (holding that gasoline was subject to federal, state, and tribal fuel excise taxes
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matter of fairness and pragmatism, has limits based on political
83
84
boundaries and on the political relationships of taxpayers.
Transactions taking place wholly outside of political boundaries are
not subject to taxation by a government unless the taxpayer has a
85
political relationship with the particular government.
For example, Canada cannot impose its income tax on me if I am
not present in Canada, earn no income there, have no economic
connections with Canada, and am not a Canadian citizen. As it turns
out, none of these conditions applies to me, and, as a result, I pay no
income tax to Canada. However, if I lived in Canada, earned income
there, or owned income-producing property there, then any of these
conditions would enable Canada to assert its taxing power over me
86
and my income. An important ingredient in Canada’s potential
power to tax me is Canada’s territory—its political boundaries. These
boundaries determine when I am in or not in Canada and also
whether I own property there.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, the “where” question is often
87
critical when deciding whether a state or tribal tax is valid. After
Carcieri, many tens of thousands of acres of land are not so clearly
Indian Country anymore. This means that state taxation is less
restricted and that tribal taxation is barred on these “Carcieri” lands.
In the context of taxation in Indian Country, things get even
more complicated because we have at least three potential govern88
ments trying to tax the same person, thing, or activity. As between
the federal and the state power to tax, some constitutional limitations
apply, but basically both governments are largely free to tax the same
89
90
91
thing. For example, a state and a federal fuel excise tax applies to
when sold at a tribal gas station owned by the Tribe and located on tribal lands).
83. Generally, this requires some nexus, connection, or minimum contacts with
the taxing jurisdiction sufficient to justify taxation. See John A. Swain, State Income
Taxation: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 345 (2003)
(discussing the constitutional nexus standard for state income tax and evaluating
whether this standard reflects good tax policy).
84. See, e.g., Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (subjecting a person to the U.S.
federal income tax solely on the basis of citizenship even though the taxpayer had no
physical or economic presence in the United States).
85. See id.
86. See Canada Revenue Agency, Non-Residents of Canada, http://www.cra-arc
.gc.ca/tx/nnrsdnts/ndvdls/nnrs-eng.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) (explaining
circumstances when non-residents are subject to Canada’s income tax).
87. See, e.g., Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 101–02.
88. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 918–20.
89. See, e.g., Scott A. Taylor, The Importance of Being Interest: Why a State Cannot
Impose Its Income Tax on Tribal Bonds, 9 (2009), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
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the sale of gasoline. The same is true for tobacco products, alco93
94
hol, and income. The federal government, however, does not have
95
a property tax or a retail sales tax. Most states, by comparison, do
96
have property taxes and sales taxes. As between and among states,
97
rules have developed that eliminate multiple taxation. As a result,
just a single state income, property, or sales tax tends to apply.
As between tribes and states, less harmony prevails. States routinely assert their power to tax tribes and transactions taking place
within Indian Country even when federal law often bars such
98
taxation. As a result, the same transaction may be subject to both a
state and a tribal tax. When this happens, multiple tribal/state
taxation of the same income or activity hurts on-reservation activity.
For example, if both state X and tribe Y impose a $0.20 per gallon tax
on gasoline, then on-reservation gasoline will cost more because each
gallon bears a $0.40 tax whereas the gasoline sold off the reservation
99
is subject to just a $0.20 per gallon tax.
A. The Tribal Power to Tax
100

A federally recognized Indian tribe has the power to tax. This
101
This tribal
power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty.
taxing power clearly extends to tribal lands located within a tribe’s
reservation boundaries and also extends off the reservation when the
viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=scott_taylor (discussing commerce clause
limitations on state taxation).
90. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1 to -18 (2009).
91. See I.R.C. § 4081(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2009).
92. See I.R.C. § 5701 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-12-1–7-12-19 (2009).
93. See I.R.C. § 5001 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-17-1–7-17-12 (2009).
94. See I.R.C. § 1 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-2-1–7-2-36 (2009).
95. See I.R.C. §§ 1–9834 (2009).
96. See CENSUS REPORT, supra note 81.
97. See Multistate Tax Compact, http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/
Multistate_Tax_Commission/About_MTC/MTC_Compact/COMPACT(1).pdf (last
visited Dec. 10, 2009).
98. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995)
(describing Oklahoma’s unsuccessful attempt to impose its fuel excise tax on the
Tribe’s gas station operated on the reservation).
99. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005)
(involving a case where gasoline was subject to state and tribal fuel excise taxes when
sold at a tribal gas owned by the tribe and located on tribal lands).
100. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 152–53 (1980) (finding that the tribal power to tax is a “fundamental
attribute of sovereignty” and that tribes have always had a “broad measure of civil
jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands”).
101. See id.
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102

lands are held in trust by the United States. Before the Carcieri case,
lands that passed into trust were viewed as tribal lands. Consequently,
the tribal power to tax extended to such lands. After Carcieri, the
transfers into trust are viewed as invalid if the specific tribe was
recognized after the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act.
These lands no longer have the status as tribal lands. Therefore, the
tribal power to tax does not extend to them.
So for example, if a tribe has trust lands subject to the Carcieri
opinion and if the tribe also has one or more tribal taxes, then the
tribal tax on property or transactions located on these lands is
arguably invalid. The initial question is whether the “Carcieri” lands
are within or outside the tribe’s reservation boundaries. The lands in
the Carcieri case were located just outside the reservation boundary of
the Narragansett Indian Tribe, but could have been located within the
reservation because the land-to-trust provision in the Indian Reorgan103
ization Act applies to lands whether on or off existing reservations.
If these lands are on the reservation, then the ownership of the lands
is a critical question because the legal standard permitting tribal
taxation hinges on ownership. On-reservation lands owned by a nonIndian and not subject to restriction are known as “fee lands” over
which the tribe has a limited power to tax. If the lands are located
outside the reservation and are not held in trust by the United States
for the benefit of the tribe, then the tribe has no power to tax
104
activities associated with those lands.
105
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the Navajo Nation did not have the power to impose its hotel
occupancy tax on tourists who visited a hotel built on fee land located
106
within the Navajo Reservation. In the Atkinson case, the land was fee
land because the reservation boundary of the Navajo Nation was
107
extended in 1934. Following the reservation extension, owners of
lands within the extension had the option of keeping their lands as
“fee” lands or exchanging them for other federal lands located
102. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1139 (1997).
103. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2009), codifying section 5 of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985.
104. See, e.g., Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531
(10th Cir. 1995) (involving a case in which the taxpayer’s core theory was that the
lands in question were outside the boundary of the Navajo Nation and, therefore, not
Indian Country within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
105. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
106. Id. at 659.
107. Id. at 648.
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108

outside the new boundary of the Navajo Nation.
The original
owner of the land was a non-Indian who operated a trading post and
found that the extension of the reservation did not adversely affect
109
the operation of his trading post. He later sold the land to another
110
111
non-Indian. The new owner of the fee land built a hotel there.
The Navajo Nation imposed a hotel occupancy tax on all tourists
112
staying in hotels located within the Navajo Nation.
The hotel owner in the Atkinson case asserted that the hotel was
located on fee land, and that the Navajo Nation’s power to tax did not
extend to fee land unless the hotel owner had a consensual relation113
ship with the Navajo Nation.
The requirement of a consensual
relationship comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v.
114
United States. In the Montana case, the Court stated:
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
115
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.
In the Atkinson case, the Court ruled that the Navajo Nation
could not impose its hotel occupancy tax unless the taxpayer entered
116
into a consensual relationship with the Tribe. The facts of the case
showed that the taxpayer, Atkinson Trading Company, was a licensed
117
Indian trader. The Court, however, found that the licensed activity
118
The Atkinson case,
did not extend to the operation of the hotel.
then, suggests that tribes cannot impose tribal taxes on non-Indians
within the reservation when the activity takes place on fee lands unless
the activity is subject to some agreement between the taxpayer and the
119
tribe.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 649.
114. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
115. Id. at 565.
116. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656–57.
117. Id. at 656.
118. Id.
119. The Montana case is viewed as having two prongs regarding tribal authority
over fee lands. The first prong involved tribal authority when the non-member and
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On-reservation lands that are “Carcieri” lands, however, require a
different analytical approach. Initially, it is important to note that
most tribes recognized after 1934 are not likely to have much or any
fee lands located within their reservations’ boundaries because their
reservations were probably established after the end of the allotment
period. In rare cases where a tribe has “Carcieri” lands within its
reservation, the underlying owner is most likely going to be the tribe.
In such cases, the land is fee land that the tribe owns and cannot be
placed in trust because of the decision in the Carcieri case. The
Supreme Court has not yet answered the question of a tribe’s power
to tax activity on such fee lands when the owner of the lands is the
tribe. If we go back and look at the Atkinson case, and assume that the
Navajo Nation bought the land and the hotel that Atkinson Trading
Company owned, then the result is not so obvious if the land is not
placed in trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act. In
the Montana case, the Court made much of the fact that the land in
question was not tribal land, implying that tribal ownership should
120
make a difference. Almost all tribal lands within reservations are
held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the particular
tribe. Fee lands owned by a tribe within its reservation are different
from trust lands because the fee lands may be alienable without the
121
consent of the United States. Consequently, a taxpayer could argue
that tribally owned fee land should be subject to the Montana
limitations. Tribes, however, easily could argue that tribally-owned fee
lands within their reservation are essentially the equivalent of trust
lands.
On the other hand, when a tribe owns land located outside of a
the tribe had entered into a consensual relationship. The second prong provided
that a “tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. The Court in the
Atkinson case found that the taxpayer’s operation of a hotel did not threaten the
political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare of the Navajo Nation.
Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 657–58.
120. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66.
121. See Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S.
103, 113–14 (1998) (suggesting that fee lands acquired by a tribe and located on the
reservation remain freely alienable if the lands had at one time been made freely
alienable by Congress). But see 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2009), which provides that no
“purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto,
from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity,
unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution;” § 177 suggests that all lands owned by tribes have limited alienability.
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tribe’s reservation, such land and the activities taking place on it are
not subject to tribal taxation unless the lands are held in trust by the
122
United States. The Carcieri case makes an important difference here
because it cuts off a tribe’s tax base. For those tribes with a very small
land base, like the Narragansett Indian Tribe, economic development
may be quite limited. If tribes can extend their land base, then
economic development may lead to a productive tax base. With a
productive tax base, a tribe can generate revenue to fund tribal
programs that promote education, health, and general welfare. The
123
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones case contains a factual situation that
illustrates the negative implications of the Carcieri case. In Mescalero
the tribe developed a ski resort that was a success. The resort and ski
124
lifts were on federal lands located just outside the reservation. As a
result, the tribe did not have the authority to impose its own taxes on
these activities. The state of New Mexico, however, did have the
power to tax these activities even though undertaken by the tribe.
Had these activities taken place within the reservation, the tribe would
have been immune from the state taxes and would have been able to
125
impose its own tax.
In summary, the Carcieri case has the possible effect of precluding
tribes from imposing tribal taxes within their reservations on transactions taking place on lands placed into trust if the particular tribe had
not been recognized on or before the date of enactment of the Indian
Reorganization Act in 1934. If the lands are located outside the
reservation boundary, then the tribal power to tax almost certainly
does not apply.
In instances where tribes have such lands and also have been imposing tribal taxes on transactions involving those lands, the taxpayers
will very likely contest the taxes going forward and sue for refunds for
taxes paid in the past. Tribes with tax systems impose limitations on
claims for refunds so that taxpayers cannot file claims for refunds
after a certain amount of time has passed from the time the return
was filed or the tax was paid. In any case, tribes face the challenge of
losing future tax revenue and the cost of paying claims for refunds.
Tribes will be well advised to contest those refunds that are from
periods where the statute of limitations has expired. In addition,
122. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied
520 U.S. 1139 (1997).
123. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
124. Id. at 146.
125. Id. at 148.
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tribes should consider the possibility of asserting the power to tax
when the lands are within the reservation and owned in fee by the
tribe. As I explained, the Supreme Court has not yet answered this
question. The merits are on the side of the tribes because tribal
ownership of the lands, even if not held in trust by the United States,
represents an assertion of tribal sovereignty over territory. If the tribe
owns the lands, it certainly retains the inherent authority to exercise
political dominion, including the power to tax.
B. State Taxation
State taxation of federally recognized Indian tribes, their lands,
property, and activities has been a source of friction between tribes
126
127
and states for a very long time. This friction continues. Likewise,
state attempts to tax tribal members began in the nineteenth cen128
tury and continue into the twenty-first century, at least in cases
involving Native Americans who live and work on reservations but are
129
The Carcieri case produces problems
members of another tribe.
because tribes finding themselves with lands that they thought were
held in trust and, therefore, immune from state and local taxation,
may now find that state and local tax officials are eager to assert and
collect current and back taxes. The power of a state to tax tribes and
their members depends in large part on the definition of Indian
Country. For purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, Congress
defines Indian Country in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-ofway running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a
126. See, e.g., In re N.Y. Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866) (involving New York’s attempt
to tax tribal lands still occupied by tribal members).
127. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005)
(dealing with attempts by the state of Kansas to impose motor fuel taxes on gasoline
sold at a station owned by the tribe on its own reservation).
128. See, e.g., In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (holding that a
county in Kansas could not tax the lands of individual tribal members granted by the
United States under the terms of a treaty).
129. See, e.g., LaRock v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907 (Wis. 2001)
(holding that Wisconsin’s income tax applied to the income of a Native American
who lived and worked on the reservation of a tribe of which she was not a member);
Taylor, supra note 33.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 10
7. Taylor.docx

2010]

1/18/2010 9:39 PM

TAXATION AFTER CARCIERI V. SALAZAR

609

state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
130
through the same.
The U.S. Supreme Court, for purposes of limiting a state’s power
to tax, has adopted the Indian Country definition contained in 18
131
U.S.C. § 1151.
Although not explicitly confirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
132
Roberts, held that land transferred into trust and not located within a
formal reservation would be Indian Country, either as an informal
133
The Roberts
reservation or as a dependent Indian community.
decision indicates that land placed in trust, even if located outside a
tribe’s formal or informal reservation, is treated as Indian Country for
purposes of the federal common law rules that govern limitations of
134
state taxation.
In general, a state’s power to tax is much more
135
limited when it reaches into Indian Country. Conversely, this state
power to tax, when exercised outside of Indian Country, is quite
limited. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that the state
power to tax tribes outside of Indian Country is permitted unless
136
expressly prohibited by federal legislation.
After Carcieri, many
transfers into trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization are
137
not trust lands, and therefore, not Indian Country. As a result, the
federal Indian law exemption from state taxation does not extend to
these lands.
In addition, section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act contains
its own explicit tax exemption. The language in section 5 provides
that any lands taken in trust by the United States under the Indian

130. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2009).
131. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993) (using the
definition of Indian Country found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to limit Oklahoma’s power to
tax the income of tribal members).
132. 185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000).
133. Id. at 1133.
134. Id. at 1131.
135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
136. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 465 (1995)
(allowing state income taxation of tribal members residing outside of Indian Country
unless a federal law or treaty otherwise prohibits such taxation); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (allowing imposition of the New Mexico
gross receipts tax on commercial activities of a tribally-owned ski resort conducted
adjacent to, but outside, the reservation unless there is “express federal law to the
contrary”).
137. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 985 (1934) (current version
at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006); Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1061(2009).
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Reorganization Act “shall be exempt from State and local taxation.”
This specific exemption no longer applies to those lands governed by
the Carcieri case. We should not forget that in Carcieri, the State of
Rhode Island (and its political subdivisions) asserted regulatory
control over the housing development that the Narragansett Indian
Tribe undertook to build on the thirty-one acre tract that it had
139
purchased from a private landowner. The holding in the Carcieri
case means that the Secretary of Interior did not have the authority to
140
take the thirty-one acre parcel into trust for the benefit of the Tribe.
Because the transfer in trust is invalid, the Tribe remains the fee
141
owner of land located outside its reservation. The tax exemption
language in section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act does not apply
to any of those lands placed in trust for tribes recognized after the
142
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. As a result, the
non-trust status of the thirty-one acre tract exposes these “Carcieri”
lands to state and local property taxes.
The leading case on state taxation of tribal activities taking place
143
outside tribal boundaries is Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.
The
Mescalero case involved a tribal enterprise located off of, but adjacent
144
to, the Tribe’s reservation. The Tribe had the right to use the offreservation lands under a thirty-year lease it entered into with the U.S.
145
Forest Service. With the help of a federal loan, the Tribe built and
146
For the privilege of doing
operated a ski resort on these lands.
business in New Mexico, the state imposed its gross receipts tax on the
Tribe’s sales of goods and services made in connection with the
147
operation of the ski resort.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a
tribe going beyond its reservation boundaries (or outside of its Indian
Country) is subject to state regulatory authority —including a state’s
148
power to tax. In Mescalero, the state’s gross receipts tax was upheld
precisely because the lands on which the activity took place were

138. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2009) (codifying section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985).
139. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1059 (2009).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
144. Id. at 146.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 147.
148. Id. at 157–58.
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149

located outside of the Tribe’s political boundaries.
By combining Mescalero with Carcieri, we may infer that a state can
tax a tribal enterprise located outside of a tribe’s reservation and not
located on trust land set apart under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act. In the Mescalero case, New Mexico did not attempt to
impose its property tax on the underlying lands owned by the United
States because they were national forest lands. One may presume that
New Mexico understood that lands owned by the federal government
150
are immune from state property taxation. However, New Mexico
did attempt to impose its compensating use tax on the ski lift towers
151
that were erected on the ski run. The New Mexico compensating
use tax is imposed on purchasers who acquire property from out-of152
state sources. The Court in the Mescalero case erroneously assumed
that the federal lease of lands to the Tribe to construct the ski resort
153
The
was covered by section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.
Court then extended the property tax exemption in section 5 to the
ski towers because they were affixed to the land and became part of
154
the real property. The Court reasoned that a state tax on the ski
towers was effectively a tax on the land and, therefore, barred by
155
section 5.
After the Carcieri case, states undoubtedly will attempt to impose
their property taxes on lands placed in trust for tribes that were not
recognized on or after enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act.
The state of the title might possibly cloud the question of whether
state and local property taxes can apply. For example, if the United
States continues to hold the property in trust for the benefit of the
tribe, then the United States is the owner of that land. Conceivably,
this could happen because the tribe transferred lands it owned to the
Department of Interior with the expectation that these lands would be
placed in trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act. The
149. Id. at 148–49.
150. States, however, receive federal payments to compensate them for the taxexempt status of federal lands. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6907 (2009) (codifying federal
legislation enacting a program to compensate states for lost property taxes that result
from the tax-exempt status of federal lands).
151. 411 U.S. at 158–59.
152. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7 (2009).
153. See 411 U.S. at 146. A close reading of the Court’s opinion shows that the
lands on which the ski resort was located were federal lands leased by the United
States to the Tribe. If the lands had been a transfer in trust, then there would have
been no term limitation.
154. Id. at 158.
155. Id.
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United States, however, by virtue of the Carcieri case, lacks the power
to place the lands in trust under section 5 and to make them taxexempt under the statute. Unless the United States conveys the lands
back to the tribe, the United States continues to be the owner of the
lands. Lands owned by the United States are exempt from state and
156
local property taxes. No federal statute appears to waive the federal
immunity from state and local property taxation in circumstances
157
similar or identical to the facts in Carcieri. In circumstances where
the United States continues as the landowner, general federal
immunity from state and local property taxation should apply. If a
tribe gets a property tax bill, the tribe should just send it to the United
States. The United States, then, as landowner, can assert its immunity.
States and local governments that find that their taxing authority is
barred by federal immunity for “Carcieri” lands still held by the United
States cannot claim federal payments for “entitlement lands” under
the federal legislation meant to compensate local governments for
158
their loss of property tax revenue.
However, a tribe or third party may be viewed as the owner of
these “Carcieri” lands if the courts view the underlying conveyance as
void or voidable under the theory that the parties understood that the
United States had the power to place these lands in trust under the
authority granted in section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.
Clarity could be achieved if the United States conveyed the specific
“Carcieri” lands to each respective tribe or to the party that initially
had transferred the lands to the United States for the purpose of
placing them in trust. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (an agency within
the Department of Interior), however, has undertaken no efforts to
dispose of “Carcieri” lands but instead has begun a consultation
159
process to determine the best course of action. The actions being
156. See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 258 (1985)
(noting the “tax-immune status of federal lands” located within states). Presumably,
the immunity of federal lands from state and local property taxes derives from
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (holding that states could not tax federal
instrumentalities).
157. See United States v. Lewis County, 175 F.3d 671, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1018
(1999) (dealing with a narrow federal statute authorizing state and local property
taxation of lands owned by the federal Farm Service Agency). This author could find
no federal statute allowing state taxation of lands owned by the federal government
received from a tribe but not held in trust.
158. See 31 U.S.C. § 6901(1) (2009) (defining “entitlement lands” but not
including lands held by the United States for the benefit of Indian tribes).
159. See PowerPoint Presentation of Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Solicitor, and
Hilary Tompkins, Solicitor, Department of Interior, http://www.bia.gov/idc/groups/
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taken do not contemplate the return of “Carcieri” lands to tribes or to
160
the original transferor.
The primary difficulty here is determining which property law
governs the transfer for purposes of determining the ownership
interest of the land. Federal or state law may apply to determine the
true owner of the “Carcieri” lands. Arguably, federal law should apply
to govern the question of the title because both the United States and
a particular Indian tribe have an interest in the “Carcieri” lands. In
fact, any action to quiet title brought by a party other than the United
States or the interested tribe may very well be barred on the theory
that the United States has an interest in these lands. Congress has
waived the sovereign immunity of the United States in quiet-title
161
actions, but not when a tribe has a potential interest in the lands.
For this purpose, the applicable statute refers to “trust or restricted
162
Indian lands.” After the Carcieri case, viewing these lands as held in
“trust” would be inappropriate given the Court’s reading of the
Indian Reorganization Act as not extending land-to-trust authority to
the Secretary of the Interior for tribes recognized after the Act was
163
passed in 1934. Accordingly, the question arises whether “Carcieri”
lands should be viewed as “restricted Indian lands.”
Actually, federal legislation provides a strong argument that “Carcieri” lands are “restricted Indian lands.” The basis for this conclusion
is found in the text of the modern version of the Indian Non164
Intercourse Act. The text of the current statute clearly states that
public/documents/text/idc-002458.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
160. See id.
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (2009), which provides:
The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action
under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the
United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water
rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands . . . .
162. Id.
163. Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1068 (2009).
164. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2009). Section 177 provides:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title
or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the Constitution. Every person who, not being
employed under the authority of the United States, attempts to negotiate
such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or to treat with any such
nation or tribe of Indians for the title or purchase of any lands by them held
or claimed, is liable to a penalty of $1,000. The agent of any State who may
be present at any treaty held with Indians under the authority of the United
States, in the presence and with the approbation of the commissioner of the
United States appointed to hold the same, may, however, propose to, and
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no conveyance of lands owned by a tribe is valid unless entered into
165
pursuant to a treaty. This language appears to restrict the transfer
of lands owned by any federally recognized Indian tribe whether the
lands are located on or off the reservation. Whether tribally owned
lands located off a tribe’s reservation are “restricted” within the
meaning of the modern Indian Non-Intercourse Act is entirely
166
unclear. The status of these fee lands owned by tribes and located
outside reservations remains unclear with the result that actions to
quiet title to “Carcieri” lands may require one or more trips to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
In summary, then, continuing ownership of the land by the United States, even after the decision in the Carcieri case, provides
immunity from state and local property taxation because these lands
are owned by the federal government. If the particular tribe is the
outright owner of the lands, then state and local property taxation is
probably permitted because the lands are located outside the
reservation. If ownership of the lands is unclear, then any party other
than the United States or the particular tribe may be barred from
determining title through a quiet-title action because the restrictions
in the federal statute allowing quiet-title actions when the United
States has an interest does not waive federal sovereign immunity if the
adjust with, the Indians the compensation to be made for their claim to
lands within such State, which shall be extinguished by treaty.
Congress enacted the original version of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act in 1790.
The relevant provision of the 1790 statute states:
And be it enacted and declared, That no sale of lands made by any Indians,
or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to
any person or persons or to any state, whether having the right of preemption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly
executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United
States.
Act of July 22, 1790, ch. XXXIII, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138.
165. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2009).
166. Compare Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189, 195 (10th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958) (finding that lands purchased by and owned in fee simple
by the Pueblo of Laguna, a federally recognized Indian tribe, were restricted lands for
purposes of 25 U.S.C. § 177), with Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538,
550 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 913 (1997) (finding that fee lands outside the
reservation and purchased by the tribe were not “tribal trust property” within the
meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 81, which requires BIA approval of contracts with tribes
involving “tribal trust property”). See City of Sherill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S.
197 (2005) (allowing state taxation of fee lands purchased by the Oneida Indian
Nation and not placed in trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act
under special circumstances where the formal reservation boundaries from 1795 had
not been confirmed and the land claims of the tribe were subject to ongoing
negotiations).
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167

lands involved may be restricted Indian lands.
State income taxation of a tribe is another matter. As a general
rule, a tribe is immune from state income taxation for activities that it
undertakes within its reservation or within lands deemed to be Indian
168
Country of the tribe under 28 U.S.C. § 1151. In the Carcieri case,
the Tribe’s housing authority undertook its housing development on
169
the lands in question. It appears that the housing authority was a
170
unit of the tribal government. Arguably, the income earned by the
tribal housing authority is income that is subject to the Rhode Island
171
income tax. Whether the housing authority is one of these business
entities is unclear. If the Narragansett Tribe had incorporated its
housing authority under section 19 of the Indian Reorganization
172
Act, then Rhode Island would be in a good position to argue that
the housing authority is a corporation that, once it starts collecting
rents from its tenants, has income subject to Rhode Island’s corporate
173
income tax.
Under the authority of the Mescalero case, states will
likely assert the power to tax incomes earned by tribes or their legal
entities on activities taking place outside of the tribes’ reservation or
outside their Indian Country.
The imposition of other state taxes on a federally recognized
Indian tribe usually requires an inquiry into the legal incidence of a
particular tax. If the legal incidence of a state tax falls on the tribe
and if the activity takes place within the tribe’s reservation or Indian
Country, then the state tax is preempted as a matter of federal Indian
167. See Scott A. Taylor, The Native American Law Opinions of Judge Noonan: Do We
Hear the Faint Voice of Bartolome de las Casas?, 1 ST. THOMAS L.J. 148, 167–69 (2003).
168. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995).
169. See supra Part I.
170. See Housing Department, Narragansett Indian Tribe’s Website,
http://www.narragansett-tribe.org/housing-dept.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009)
(describing its housing projects, including the project for twelve one-bedroom units
on the land in question subject to an agreement with the Town of Charlestown).
171. The Rhode Island income tax applies to individuals, corporations, and other
business entities. See R.I. Stat. § 44-11-2 (2009) (corporate income tax); § 44-30-1
(2009) (income tax imposed on individuals, estate, and trusts).
172. See 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2009) (allowing the formation of federally chartered
corporations that are wholly owned by the particular tribe that seeks the charter). See
also Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19 (ruling that a section 17 corporation owned by a
federally recognized Indian tribe is exempt from the federal income tax for income
earned on or off the reservation but not providing any authority concerning state
income taxation).
173. See R.I. Stat. § 44-11-2(a) (2009) (imposing a 9% tax on the net income of
corporations); § 44-11-1(2) (defining a corporation as “every corporation,” which
presumably includes a corporation incorporated under section 17 of the Indian
Reorganization Act and owned by an Indian tribe).
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law unless a federal statute authorizes the imposition of the state
174
tax. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation is the leading case
on legal incidence. Determining legal incidence is not such an easy
task, but in general, legal incidence falls on the person designated in
the statute as the taxpayer responsible for collecting and paying the
175
tax.
Because legal incidence is coupled with the location of the
activity, a tribe’s immunity from a state tax does not extend to off176
reservation activities. The facts in the Chickasaw case illustrate this
principle quite well. The Chickasaw Nation owned and operated a gas
177
station on tribal lands (within the Nation’s Indian Country).
Oklahoma imposed a gasoline excise tax on the retail sellers of
gasoline. Accordingly, the legal incidence of the fuel excise tax fell
178
on the Chickasaw Nation. Because of the legal incidence of the tax
and the location of the activity, the state excise tax was preempted
179
and, therefore, invalid. If the Chickasaw Nation had been a tribe
recognized after 1934, and if it had located its gas station on “Carcieri”
lands, then the location of the gas station would have been outside
the reservation and outside Indian Country. In that case, then,
Oklahoma’s gasoline excise tax would have been valid.
After the Carcieri case, state income taxation of members also
becomes a critical issue. The residence of tribal members has a
critical impact on whether a state can impose its income tax on
180
them. If a tribal member lives and works on the tribe’s reservation
or on off-reservation trust lands of the tribe, then a state cannot
181
impose its income tax on that person. However, if the person lives
outside the reservation or not on trust lands, even though he or she
may work on the reservation or have income derived from the tribe, a
182
state is free to impose its income tax on a tribal member.
The Cacieri case is a good illustration of this principle allowing
state income taxation of tribal members who do not live within Indian
Country. Let us suppose that ten elderly tribal members live on the
Narragansett Indian Tribe’s housing development located on the

174.
(1995).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458–59
Id. at 459.
See id. at 462–67.
See id. at 452–53.
See id. at 461.
Id. at 454.
See id. at 464.
See id.
See id.
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thirty-one-acre tract of land that the U.S. Supreme Court found could
not be held in trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.
Let us further assume that these ten tribal members receive modest
distributions from the Tribe and that these distributions constitute
income for federal income tax purposes. These ten tribal members,
because they are living on lands outside the reservation of their tribe
and outside what the Supreme Court has defined as the Tribe’s
Indian Country, must pay Rhode Island’s income tax. If the tribal
payments are relatively small, then the Rhode Island income tax on
each of these tribal members may be zero or a small amount because
the Rhode Island income tax is twenty-five percent of the federal
183
income tax. So, for example, if the federal income tax were $1000,
then the Rhode Island income tax would be twenty-five percent of this
amount, or $250. If, however, the payments by the Tribe were
substantial, and if the resulting federal income tax were $10,000 for a
particular member, then the Rhode Island income tax for this tribal
member would be $2500. Whether state income taxation of these
tribal members is justified when they have changed their residence by
just moving across the road is questionable, especially if the tribe is
providing all or most of the social services they need.
Housing for tribal members, especially for those tribes with a
small land base, is a legitimate reason for expanding a tribe’s land
base. If the tribe in question is one that was recognized after
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act, then putting land into
trust for such a tribe wanting to provide housing for members is not
an attractive option if exposure to state income taxation would be
costly for individual members. For those gaming tribes that make
substantial per capita payments to members, exposure to state income
taxation now arises if they find themselves living on “Carcieri” lands.
The income tax liability could be sizable because most of these
individuals have not filed state income tax returns. Without having
filed a return, these individuals are not protected by the statute of
limitations. In most states, the statute of limitations against assessment of income taxes is a relatively long period if a return is not
184
filed. Interest on the unpaid income taxes will certainly increase
the size of the liability.
183. See R.I. STAT. § 44-30-2-1(1)(xii) (2009).
184. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. 7-1-18(C) (2009) (providing a seven-year statute of
limitations if the taxpayer does not file an income tax return), with I.R.C. §
6501(c)(3) (2009) (providing an unlimited period if the taxpayer does not file a
federal income tax return).
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C. Federal Taxation
Federal income taxation in Indian Country remains largely unchanged after the Carcieri case. In general, federally recognized
Indian tribes, their units of government, and their wholly owned
corporations formed under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization
185
Act are exempt from the federal income tax. This exemption from
income taxation applies whether the activities take place on or off the
186
reservation of a tribe or within or outside its Indian Country.
Federal income taxation of tribal members is generally broad with a
187
narrow exemption for income derived directly from tribal lands.
The exemption applies to timber, crops, cattle, oil and gas, and
188
extraction of minerals.
Another exemption from the federal
income tax applies for income derived from the exercise of treaty
189
fishing rights.
Tribal exemption from certain federal excise taxes depends on
the underlying purpose of the activity. For example, exemption from
the federal fuel excise tax requires that the use of the fuel be
restricted to furtherance of an essential governmental function of the
190
tribe. Federal payroll taxes apply to tribes as employers, and the
191
status of the lands where tribal employees work is irrelevant. As a
result, the Carcieri case does not change the imposition of these taxes.
Tribal bonds, however, are potentially affected. Tribes have the
authority to issue three types of bonds. The first type is an “essential
governmental function” bond where the proceeds are used to fund
construction of roads, sewers, water systems, schools, health care
192
facilities, and government buildings. The statute authorizing the
issuance of these bonds does not require that the proceeds be spent
on projects within the reservation. The housing project undertaken
by the Narragansett Indian Tribe in Carcieri probably would qualify for
tax-exempt tribal bond financing because providing housing for the
185. See Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19.
186. See id.
187. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (extending a federal income tax
exemption to the proceeds derived from cutting timber on allotted land held in trust
for an individual Indian); see also Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55 (discussing the
requirement that the income must be derived directly from the land).
188. See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55.
189. See I.R.C. § 7873.
190. See id. § 7871(b).
191. See In re Cabazon Indian Casino, 57 B.R. 398, 403 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986)
(upholding the imposition of both FICA and FUTA taxes).
192. See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4), (c)(1).
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elderly would be viewed as an essential governmental function of the
193
kind undertaken by state and local governments.
The second type of tribal bond allows funding of manufacturing
194
facilities owned by the tribe and located on lands held in trust for
195
the tribe by the United States. It is possible that some tribes may
have issued these bonds to fund manufacturing facilities located on
“Carcieri” lands. If so, the bonds are no longer tax-exempt after the
Carcieri case because the Secretary of Interior, according to the
Supreme Court, lacked the authority to place the lands in trust under
section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act. The owners of these
bonds are probably not in a position to know whether these bonds
have lost their exempt status. The Bureau of Indian Affairs does not
provide a list of “Carcieri” lands and may be unable to ever provide a
complete list.
196
The third type of bond is relatively new. Congress allowed the
197
issuance of “tribal economic development bonds” in February 2009.
The proceeds from these bonds cannot be used to fund facilities
198
located outside a tribe’s reservation. As a result, the Carcieri case
also has a negative impact on these bonds. Because the statute came
into effect in February 2009, and because the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in the Carcieri case on February 24, 2009, it is very likely
that no tribal economic development bonds have or will be issued to
fund the construction of facilities located on “Carcieri” lands.
Finally, two federal tax incentives are adversely affected by the
Carcieri decision. The first is the Indian employment income tax
199
credit. This credit allows an employer to claim a substantial credit
for employing Native Americans within Indian Country. The statute
requires that substantially all of the work be performed on the
200
reservation. As a result, “Carcieri” lands would not qualify as a place
of employment for purposes of this credit. This tax credit expires at
201
the end of 2009. The other tax incentive is rapid depreciation for
202
facilities built on Indian reservations. The definitions for an Indian
193. See id. § 7871(e).
194. See id. § 7871(c)(3).
195. See id. § 7871(c)(3)(B)(iii)(I), (c)(3)(E)(i).
196. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div.
B, tit. I, subtit. E, § 1402(a), 123 Stat. 351 (2009).
197. See I.R.C. § 7871(f).
198. See id. § 7871(f)(3)(B)(ii).
199. See id. § 45A.
200. See id. § 45A(c)(1)(B).
201. See id. § 45A(f).
202. See id. § 168(j).
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203

reservation exclude “Carcieri” lands. And like the Indian employ204
ment credit, the provision expires at the end of 2009.
V. CONCLUSION
The Carcieri case is troubling for two important reasons. First, it
ruptures the goals of the Indian Reorganization Act which Congress
intended as a way to reconstitute Indian tribes, to provide a basis for
self-government, and to help them expand their land base. Second,
the Carcieri case, because it involves so many tribes and so many
transfers of land, will generate enormous amounts of litigation over
regulation and taxation. Most tribes and states would rather go about
the business of promoting economic development on and around
Indian reservations so that tribal members and those non-members
who work for tribal enterprises can go about the business of raising
their families and attending to their children’s education, health, and
general well being. Consequently, a statutory solution may be the best
course of action to correct the Court’s erroneous decision in Carcieri.
On September 24, 2009, North Dakota Senator Bryan Dorgan
introduced such a bill in the United States Senate. This bill, if passed,
would amend the Indian Reorganization Act to make clear that the
Secretary of Interior does have the authority to place lands in trust for
any and all federally recognized Indian tribes without regard to the
205
date of their recognition. Prospects for passage are uncertain given
concerns over the bill’s possible effect on the expansion of Indian
gaming.

203. See I.R.C. § 168(j)(6).
204. See id. § 168(j)(8).
205. See S. 1703, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-1703.
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